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Privacy-Preserving and Veriﬁable
Data Aggregation
Hieu N TRAN a, Robert H DENG a and HweeHwa PANG a
aSchool of Information Systems, Singapore Management University
Abstract. There are several recent research studies on privacy-preserving aggrega-
tion of time series data, where an aggregator computes an aggregation of multiple
users’ data without learning each individual’s private input value. However, none
of the existing schemes allows the aggregation result to be veriﬁed for integrity. In
this paper, we present a new data aggregation scheme that protects user privacy as
well as integrity of the aggregation. Towards this end, we ﬁrst propose an aggre-
gate signature scheme in a multi-user setting without using bilinear maps. We then
extend the aggregate signature scheme into a solution for privacy-preserving and
veriﬁable data aggregation. The solution allows multiple users to periodically send
encrypted data to an untrusted aggregator such that the latter is able to compute the
sum of the input data values and verify its integrity, without learning any other in-
formation. A formal security analysis shows that the solution is semantically secure
and unforgeable.
Keywords. data aggregation, data privacy, veriﬁable computation, aggregate
signature
1. Introduction
Data aggregation, in which an aggregator computes aggregated results over multiple
sources, has been widely used in real-world applications such as network coding, smart
grid, mobile sensing and cloud services. In order to prevent leakage of sensitive in-
formation, the aggregator should be able to perform aggregation operations such as
sum, average, variance on users’ data without learning their individual values. Symmet-
ric key homomorphic encryption schemes, which are normally based on one-time pad
encryption, could be applied to protect the conﬁdentiality of user data [1]. However,
such schemes assume that the aggregator is fully trusted since each user shares a secret
key with the aggregator. Therefore, these schemes protect data conﬁdentiality against
outsiders, but they do not protect users’ data privacy against the aggregator.
Recently, several research studies have addressed the privacy-preserving data aggre-
gation problem under the assumption of an untrusted aggregator [2,3]. Shi et al. proposed
a construction that allows the untrusted aggregator to compute the sum of time series data
[2]. However, the aggregator must use brute-force search or Pollard’s lambda method
[4] to decrypt the sum, which is not efﬁcient for applications requiring a large plaintext
space. Li et al. [3] proposed an efﬁcient aggregation scheme based on a novel key man-
agement technique, where only computation of key hashes is needed for encrypting data
by users and for decrypting the sum of data values by the aggregator.
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In many critical control and monitoring systems, ensuring the integrity of aggrega-
tion results is extremely important. In such systems, any invalid aggregation result due to
tampering by malicious attackers must be detected and rejected by the aggregator. There
are two generic mechanisms for verifying the integrity of aggregation results aggregate
message authentication codes (MACs) [5,6] and aggregate signatures [7,8,9,10,11,12].
The notion of aggregate MAC was ﬁrst proposed by Katz et al. [5]. Agrawal et al. [13]
proposed a homomorphic MAC scheme, a generalization of aggregate MAC, that allows
a network node to compute a MAC of combined code words in networking coding. Ag-
gregate MAC and homomorphic MAC require shared secret keys between the data gen-
erators and aggregators. In contrast, aggregate signature schemes enable anyone with the
correct public keys to verify the integrity of aggregation results. However, most of the ex-
isting aggregate signature schemes [7,8,9,10,11,12] are constructed using bilinear maps
and are not suitable for resource-constrained system settings such as sensor networks.
Our Contribution. Our goal is to propose an efﬁcient construction for privacy-
preserving and veriﬁable data aggregation. The main contributions of this paper are as
follows:
• We ﬁrst introduce an aggregate signature scheme for public veriﬁcation of the
integrity of aggregated data in a multi-user setting. In this scheme, each user sends
his data and a signature to an aggregator, where the signature is generated on the
data using the user’s secret key. The aggregator combines all the users’ data and
signatures into an aggregated result and an aggregated signature, respectively, and
checks the validity of the result using public system parameters.
• Extending the aggregate signature scheme, we further propose a privacy-
preserving and veriﬁable data aggregation (PVDA) scheme. PVDA allows multi-
ple users to periodically send encrypted data to an untrusted aggregator such that
the latter is able to compute the sum of the data values and verify its integrity
but not learn any other information. Our formal security analysis shows that the
solution is semantically secure and unforgeable.
2. Related Work
We survey prior work on privacy-preserving and veriﬁable data aggregation, aggregate
MAC and aggregate signature.
Privacy-Preserving Data Aggregation Many protocols have been proposed for privacy-
preserving data aggregation in wireless sensor network (WSN) or mobile sensing
[1,3,14,15,16,17], without considering the integrity of aggregation result. Shi et al. [2]
proposed a construction that allows a group of users to send encrypted data to an un-
trusted aggregator. The construction is not efﬁcient for applications requiring a large
plaintext space because the aggregator must use brute-force search to decrypt a sum. Li
et al. [3] extended the construction in [2] using a new key management technique to
ensure that the aggregator could only obtain the sum of the users’ private data but not
the private data of each user. Our PVDA construction solution is motivated by [2,3], but
provide veriﬁable assurance in addition to data privacy.
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Aggregate MAC and Aggregate Signature Aggregate MACs [5,13] allow veriﬁcation
of the integrity of aggregation data in private setting. Recently, Catalano and Fiore
[18] proposed homomorphic MAC schemes that support a set of functionalities (i.e.,
polynomially-bounded arithmetic circuits); however, in their construction, the veriﬁer
possesses the user’s secret key and hence is able to access users’ private data. Aggregate
signatures [8,9,10,11,12] also allow veriﬁcation of the integrity of aggregation data but
in public setting. Most of the existing aggregate signature (or more generally homomor-
phic signature) schemes are constructed on bilinear maps and unsuitable for resource-
constrained applications.
Veriﬁable and Privacy-Preserving Data Aggregation Lin et al. [19] proposed a multi-
dimensional privacy preserving data aggregation scheme for WSN. This scheme adapts
the super-increasing sequences and permutation techniques from [1] for data aggrega-
tion. However, the scheme assumes that the aggregator is fully trusted. Papadopoulos et
al. [20] presented a scheme that utilizes a combination of homomorphic encryption and
secret sharing. Although their scheme works efﬁciently on time series data, the data pri-
vacy of each node may be breached if the querier colludes with the aggregator, since the
querier has the secret key of every node.
3. A New Aggregate Signature Scheme
3.1. Overview
Our system model consists of three types of entities: a set of n users {u1, ...,un}, an ag-
gregator, and a key generation center. The key generation center creates a public param-
eter S , as well as a key pair ski and pki for every user ui. We assume that key pairs
(ski,pki) for all i= 1, ...,n are distributed to the corresponding users via a secure channel
at system initialization.
In each time period, each user ui generates a private datummi ∈Zp where p is a large
prime number. The aggregator is a powerful base station that performs data aggregation
operations such as sum(M) =m1+ ...+mn, where M = (m1, ...,mn) is a vector of all the
users’ private data.
We assume that the aggregator is honest but curious. He is trusted to perform ag-
gregation operations, but may attempt to discover individual users’ private data. We also
assume that users follow the correct aggregation process, do not trust each other and are
curious as well. Some curious users may collude with the aggregator by revealing their
secret keys in order to deduce additional information about the remaining users.
3.2. Deﬁnition
An aggregate signature scheme is a tuple of three probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT)
algorithms (KeyGen, Sign, Verify) as follows:
• KeyGen(1λ ) algorithm is executed by the key generation center. It takes as input
a security parameter λ and outputs a pair of public key pki and secret key ski for
each user ui along with a set of random values S as public parameter.
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• Sign(ski,mi, t) algorithm is executed by each user ui. It takes as input a secret key
ski, datum mi and time period t, and outputs a signature τi ∈ Zp. User ui then
sends (mi,τi) to the aggregator.
• Verify(pk,S ,M,T, t) algorithm is executed by the aggregator. It takes as in-
put a vector of public keys pk = (pk1, ...,pkn), the set S , a vector of data
M = (m1, ...,mn), a vector of signatures T = (τ1, ...,τn) and a time period t. It
outputs ‘1’ (accept) or ‘0’ (reject).
Security. We allow the adversary to request a vector of signatures T for an arbitrary
vector of data M along with period time t of his choice. Note that set S is a public
parameter, hence anyone can compute and verify the integrity of an aggregation result.
The adversary breaks the aggregate signature scheme if he is able to output a valid triple
(M,T, t) where either period time t is new, or he has not previously requested signatures
on the vector of data M. We deﬁne the security of our scheme in terms of the following
game between a challenger and an adversary A .
Game 1 Let H = (KeyGen,Sign,Verify) denote an aggregate signature scheme.
• Setup: The challenger generates a set of random values S and n key pairs
{(ski,pki)}ni=1, then sends S and pk= (pk1, ...,pkn) to the adversary.
• Queries: The adversary submits signature queries, each of the form (Mj, t j) where
Mj = (m1, j, ..., mn, j) ∈ Znp and t j ∈ {0,1}∗. We require the time periods t j sub-
mitted by the adversary to be distinct. The challenger performs the following:
for all i= 1, ...,n do
τi, j ← Sign(ski,mi, j, t j)
send Tj = (τ1, j, ...,τn, j) to A
• Output: The adversary outputs a vector of data M∗, a vector of signatures
T ∗ and a time period t∗. The adversary wins the security game if 1 ←
Verify(pk,S ,M∗,T ∗, t∗), and one of the following conditions hold:
∗ Type 1 forgery: t∗ = t j for all j.
∗ Type 2 forgery: t∗ = t j for some j, and M∗ =Mj.
The advantage uf-adv[A ,H ] of adversary A with the aggregate signature scheme
H is deﬁned as the probability that A wins Game 1.
Deﬁnition 1 The aggregate signature scheme H is existentially unforgeable under
an adaptive chosen-message attack if, for all PPT adversaries A , the advantage uf-
adv[A ,H ] is negligible.
3.3. Construction
Let G be a cyclic group of prime order p on which the discrete logarithm problem is
hard. Let M = (m1, ...,mn) ∈ Znp denote a vector of n users’ data values, where mi < p
for i= 1, ...,n and ∑ni=1mi ≤ p. Let f : Zp×{0,1}∗ → Zp be a pseudo-random function
(PRF). The three algorithms (KeyGen, Sign, Verify) are given as follows.
• KeyGen(1λ ): The key generation center chooses a random generator g ∈G, gen-
erates a set of nα random values S = (s1, ...,snα) ∈ Znαp and divides them into
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n disjoint subsets Si such that each subset Si has α values, S =
⋃n
i=1Si and
∀i = j,Si⋂S j = /0. The key generation center assigns Si to user ui and S to
the aggregator. Each user ui then generates a random integer ai and computes
hi = gai . Each user ui has a secret key ski = 〈Si,ai〉 and a public key pki = 〈g,hi〉.
• Sign(ski,mi, t): Given secret key ski and datum mi for period time t, user ui com-
putes a signature τi = ai×mi+FSi(t) mod p, where FSi(t) =∑s∈Si fs(t) mod p,
then sends (mi,τi) to the aggregator.
• Verify(pk,S ,M,T, t): For each time period t, the aggregator computes an ag-
gregate signature T = ∑ni=1 τi = ∑
n
i=1(ai ×mi + FSi(t)) mod p. The aggrega-
tor then veriﬁes the integrity of the aggregate signature T using public keys
pk= (pk1, ...,pkn) and S = {s1, ...,snα} as follows:
- Y =∏ni=1 h
mi
i ∈G.
- If gT = g∑s∈S fs(t)×Y , output ‘1’ (accept); otherwise output ‘0’ (reject).
Security. AdversaryA is able to succeed in a forgery attack and win the security Game
1 if he knows the secret key of any of the n users. However, his chance of guessing
any user’s secret key is negligible, as Lemma 1 shows. We prove security assuming F
is a secure PRF, and the discrete logarithm assumption holds in G. We refer to [4] for a
deﬁnition of the PRF and discrete logarithm security games. The proofs are given in the
full version of this paper.
Lemma 1 In our aggregate signature scheme, the probability of successfully discovering
any user’s private key through brute-force guessing is negligible.
Theorem 1 The aggregate signature scheme is existentially unforgeable under an adap-
tive chosen-message attack, assuming F is a secure PRF and the discrete logarithm prob-
lem is hard.
4. Privacy-Preserving and Veriﬁable Data Aggregation
The aggregate signature scheme introduced in the previous section does not maintain
conﬁdentiality of users’ data. We now propose a privacy-preserving and veriﬁable data
aggregation (PVDA) scheme that extends the aggregate signature scheme.
4.1. Deﬁnition
PVDA comprises four algorithms (KeyGen, Enc, Sign, AggDec) as follows:
• KeyGen(1λ ) algorithm remains the same as in Section 3.2.
• Enc(ski,mi, t) algorithm is executed by each user ui. It takes as input secret key
ski, datum mi and time period t, and outputs a ciphertext ci ∈ Zp.
• Sign(ski,ci, t) algorithm is as in Section 3, except that mi is replaced by ciphertext
ci. Each user sends (ci,τi) to the aggregator where τi ← Sign(ski,ci, t).
• AggDec(pk,S ,C,T, t) algorithm is executed by the aggregator. It takes as input
public keys PK= (pk1, ...,pkn), the setS , a vector of ciphertextsC= (c1, ...,cn),
a vector of signatures T = (τ1, ...,τn) and time period t. It outputs an aggregation
result M = m1 + ...+mn if the Verify algorithm as in Section 4.2 outputs ‘1’;
otherwise it outputs error ⊥.
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Security. The security notion for PVDA includes semantic security and unforgeability.
Let P = (KeyGen, Enc, Sign, AggDec) denote the PVDA scheme.
Game 2 Semantic security of the PVDA scheme is deﬁned by the following game be-
tween a challenger and an adversary A :
• Setup: The challenger generates a set S of nα random values and n key pairs
(ski,pki) for i = 1, ...,n. The challenger gives the public parameters 〈S ,pk =
(pk1, ...,pkn)〉 to the adversary. The former also initializes a list L= /0 for tracking
the queries from A .
• Queries: The adversary adaptively queries the challenger for encryption. Each
query states m ∈ Zp, index i of user ui and time period t. The query is rejected if
the tuple (i, t) exists in L; otherwise, the challenger computes c ← Enc(ski,m, t)
and τ ← Sign(ski,c, t), sends (c,τ) to A and inserts (i, t) into L.
• Challenge: The adversary A submits m0, m1 ∈ Zp along with index i∗ and time
period t∗ to the challenger; L must not already contain the tuple (i∗, t∗). The chal-
lenger computes c∗ ← Enc(ski∗ ,mb, t∗), τ∗ ← Sign(ski∗ ,c∗, t∗) under a random
bit b ∈ {0,1}, and sends (c∗,τ∗) to adversary A .
• Output: AdversaryA outputs b′, representing his guess for b, and wins the game
if b′ = b.
The advantage ss-adv[A ,P] of adversaryA with respect toP is deﬁned as |Pr[b=
b′]− 12 |, where the probability is taken over the random bit used by the challenger and
the adversary A .
Deﬁnition 2 The PVDA scheme P is semantically secure if, for all PPT adversary A ,
the advantage ss-adv[A ,P] is negligible.
Game 3 Unforgeability of the PVDA scheme is deﬁned by the following game between
a challenger and an adversary A :
• Setup: The challenger generates a set S of nα random values and n key pairs
(SKi,PKi) for i= 1, ...,n. The challenger gives public parameters 〈S ,PK1, ...,PKn〉
to the adversary.
• Queries: The adversary adaptively submits (Mj, t j) to the challenger as in Game
1. The challenger responds with (c1, j,τ1, j), ...,(cn, j,τn, j) for each query, where
ci, j is the ciphertext of mi, j , and τi, j is the signature of ci, j for i = 1, ...,n. We
require all the time periods t j’s in the queries to be distinct.
• Output: The adversary outputs the set of n pairs (c∗1,τ∗1 ) , ...,(c∗n,τ∗n ) for M∗ =
(m∗1, ...,m
∗
n) and time period t
∗ such that either t∗ is a new time period or M∗ has
not been queried before. The adversary wins the game if the AggDec algorithm
outputs M ∗ = ∑ni=1m∗i .
The advantage uf-adv[A ,P] of adversary A with respect to P is deﬁned as the proba-
bility that A wins Game 3.
Deﬁnition 3 Our PVDA scheme P is unforgeable if, for all PPT adversary A , the ad-
vantage uf-adv[A ,P] is negligible.
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4.2. Construction
In order to protect the privacy of users’ data while providing veriﬁability of aggregation
results, we use the technique of Li et al. [3] in encryption. However, PVDA is more
practical because Li et al.’s scheme does not provide veriﬁability. The four algorithms
(KeyGen, Enc, Sign, AggDec) in PVDA are given below.
• KeyGen(1λ ): The same as in the aggregate signature scheme.
• Enc(ski,mi, t): User ui generates encryption keys ki =FSi(t‖1) and k′i =FSi(t‖2),
where ‖ denotes concatenation. Next, the user encrypts his datum mi by comput-
ing a ciphertext ci = mi+ ki mod p.
• Sign(ski,ci, t): User ui computes a signature τi on the output ci of the Enc al-
gorithm using his private value ai and encryption key k′i by computing τi =
ai× ci+ k′i mod p. User ui then sends (ci,τi) to the aggregator.
• AggDec(pk,S ,C,T, t): In each time period t, the aggregator generates decryp-
tion keys k0 = FS (t‖1) and k′0 = FS (t‖2). Upon receiving C = (c1, ...,cn) and
T = (τ1, ...,τn) from all the n users, the aggregator computes:
T =
n
∑
i=1
τi mod p, X =
n
∑
i=1
ci mod p, Y =
n
∏
i=1
hcii
The aggregation signatureT is valid if and only if gT = gk
′
0 ×Y . The aggregator
outputs aggregation resultM =∑ni=1mi =X −k0 mod p if signatureT is valid;
otherwise, it returns error ⊥.
Security. We now formally state and prove the semantic security and unforgeability
assurances of PVDA. We note that Lemma 1 applies to PVDA. The proofs of the security
theorems are given in the full version of this paper.
Theorem 2 The PVDA scheme P is semantically secure if, for all PPT adversaries A ,
the advantage ss-adv[A ,P] is negligible assuming F is a secure PRF.
Theorem 3 The PVDA scheme P is unforgeable if, for all PPT adversaries A , the
advantage uf-adv[A ,P] of adversary A is negligible assuming F is a secure PRF and
the discrete logarithm problem is hard.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we presented an aggregate signature scheme that is suitable for data ag-
gregation in a multi-user setting. In the scheme, each user computes a signature on his
data using a secret key. An aggregator computes the sum of the users’ data and combines
their signatures into a single aggregate signature. Using public system parameters and
the aggregate signature, the aggregator is able to verify the integrity of the sum. To pro-
tect the users’ data privacy, we further extended the aggregate signature scheme into a
privacy-preserving and veriﬁable data aggregation (PVDA) scheme for time series data
in the same multi-user setting. We formally proved that the PVDA scheme is semanti-
cally secure and existentially unforgeable. Compared to existing alternatives in the liter-
ature, our PVDA scheme offers two key advantages in assuming an untrusted aggregator,
and being computationally efﬁcient as no bilinear maps are used.
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